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OVERDETERMINED ATROCITIES

James G. Stewart*
An event is over-determined if there are multiple sufficient
causes for its occurrence. A firing squad is a classic illustration. If
eight soldiers are convened to execute a prisoner, they can all walk
away afterwards in the moral comfort that “I didn’t really make a
difference; it would have happened without me.” The difficulty is,
if we are only responsible for making a difference to harm
occurring in the world, none of the soldiers are responsible for the
death—none made, either directly or through others, an essential
contribution to the death. In many respects, this dilemma is the
leitmotif for individual responsibility in a globalized world, where
criminal harm is so frequently occasioned by collectives. In order
to assess the various solutions offered for the overdetermination
problem in criminal theory, this paper reconsiders arguments for
and against requiring causation in criminal responsibility,
competing theoretical accounts of causation and the various
unsatisfactory explanations for overdetermination presently on
offer. While the paper uses examples from international criminal
justice as illustrations, it concludes that overdetermination is a
central moral problem of our time. A range of significant
consequences follow for the theory and practice of international
criminal law.
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For Antonio Cassese. An essential contribution. Directly, and
through others.

I. INTRODUCTION
An event is overdetermined if there are multiple sufficient
causes for its occurrence. A firing squad offers a classic
illustration. If eight soldiers are lined up to execute a blindfolded
prisoner and all shoot at the same time, none of the soldiers makes
a difference to the plight of the slain victim; she would have died
regardless of whether any one of the soldiers participated or not.
So even if one of the shooters had refused to fire, seven other
bullets would still have found their mark and ended the prisoner’s
life in a more or less indistinguishable manner. Indeed, the firing
squad was designed and constituted so as to allow each of the
soldiers who participated to walk away in the moral comfort that,
“I didn’t really make a difference; it would have happened without
me.” The difficulty is, if we are only responsible for making a
difference to harm occurring in the world, none of the soldiers are
responsible for the death—none made, either directly or through
others, an essential contribution.
This moral quandary is, by and large, the leitmotif for
international criminal justice. Very few atrocities are so dependent
on the acts of any one individual that we can say with confidence
that they would certainly not have transpired absent any one
accused’s individual agency. In fact, if there were one overarching
tension in the ongoing struggle for defensible standards of blame
attribution in this discipline, it might be between our exclusive
focus on individual accountability and the pervasive influence of
collectivities that furnish a long line of willing substitute
perpetrators, thereby diluting the significance of individual agency
upon which criminal liability is predicated. Thus,
overdetermination presents a moral problem whose impact is
profound for international trials, even if overdetermined atrocities
arguably come in a variety of different forms.
In fact, there are four potential variants that help illustrate the
problematic. The first is epitomized by the fire bombing of
Dresden by Allied pilots during World War II. Over three
inglorious days in February 1945, the Allies flew three bombing
raids over Dresden, deliberately generating a firestorm that brutally
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killed civilians in the tens of thousands.1 The analogy with the
firing squad motif is very direct. As Christopher Kutz ably argues,
the estimated 8,000 crewmen who flew over 1,000 sorties over
Dresden made little real difference individually: ‘Each crewman’s
causal contribution to the conflagration, indeed each plane’s, was
marginal to the point of insignificance.’2 As a result, each of the
pilots could later safely claim that they did not personally make a
difference to the way the atrocity transpired—meaning perversely,
that no one was responsible for it.
The Dresden pilots form the classic illustration of
overdetermination, which approximates to the firing squad most
closely. First, they are perpetrators not accomplices. In discussing
the differentiated model of attribution presently in place
internationally, George Fletcher states that “[p]erpetrators or
principals are those who are directly liable for the violation of a
norm; accessories are those who are derivatively liable.”3 In this
instance, the pilots are perpetrators because they dropped the
bombs, that precipitated the firestorm, that destroyed so many
civilians. Their culpability is not contingent on that of others,
meaning that they are best described as perpetrating the death by
smoke inhalation, fire and asphyxiation that ensued. Second, they
form part of a single highly ordered organizational structure that
shared a definite and dark common goal.
Western businesspeople operating in apartheid South Africa
offer a related but distinct variant. At the end of its arduous work,
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
concluded that ‘[c]ertain businesses were involved in helping to
design and implement apartheid policies. Other businesses
benefited from cooperating with the security structures of the
former state.’4 Many of these actions constituted complicity in or
direct perpetration of crimes. Of course, the difficulty here too is
that the actions of any one business were fungible for the conduct
1

For a concise history, see C. Kutz, Complicity: ethics and law for a collective
age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), at 116–123.
2
Id. at 118.
3
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 636 (1978); In a separate
work, I argue again the differentiated model this definition assumes, but I accept
that model international criminal justice does not adopt a model like that I
advocate for. James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for
International Crimes, 25 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165–219
(2012).
4
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Volume 4, Chapter
2, “Institutional Hearing: Business and Labor, Principles Arising out of Business
Sector Hearings,” 161. N. Clark, Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations
in South Africa (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994).
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of corporations as a class; if specific companies had not
participated it would merely have left an economic vacuum others
would certainly have filled. Drawing on this reality, a number of
US companies sued under the Alien Tort Statute complained that
without their input, it was only the case that “apartheid would not
have occurred in the same way.”5 The implication is plain; these
particular companies did not cause anything.
On one level, this replicates the Dresden bombing campaign. If
a company’s board passed a motion to assist apartheid crimes by a
bare minimum (e.g. 8 votes to 7 in a corporate board with 15
members), then each board member who cast an affirmative vote
did make a difference to the downstream consequences, but in any
other voting configuration, the company would have acted as it did
regardless of any individual vote. And structurally speaking,
corporations are organizations too, so the example differs little at
the level of board deliberations. Focusing on the corporation itself,
however, yields different results. To borrow from Tracy Isaacs,
companies like those operating in apartheid South Africa are just a
mereological sum; a notional composite of a random collection of
things.6 Thus, overdetermination not only arises within
organizations, it also has relevance for groups that are only very
loosely constituted.
Perhaps unwittingly, the International Criminal Court’s first
judgment stumbles upon a third possible type of
overdetermination. In convicting Thomas Lubanga for recruiting
and using child solders, the majority seized upon his essential
contribution to the crimes as a basis for describing the warlord’s
responsibility as that of co-perpetration rather than mere
complicity,7 whereas at least one dissenting judge disputed
whether an essential contribution was required.8 Both sides of the
debate miss the wider point that these crimes would probably have
happened anyway. As Lubanga’s counsel put it, Lubanga’s role
was in no way determinative of the crime of recruiting child
soldiers, “for the simple reason that the soldiers who appointed

5

Complaint, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, (No. 07-919) 128 S. Ct. 2424 Supreme Court 2008, at 4.
6
TRACY ISAACS, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN COLLECTIVE CONTEXTS 27 (2011).
7
Judgement, Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) Judgment Pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute. 14 March 2012, § 925 (“Lubanga”); “only those to
whom essential tasks have been assigned – and who, consequently, have the
power to frustrate the commission of the crime by not performing their tasks –
can be said to have joint control over the crime”.)
8
Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fulford, Lubanga, supra note
7, § 15.
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him as leader did not need him.”9 How do we hold Lubanga
responsible at all, if his conduct made no difference?
The example raises distinct issues again. First, many would
describe this scenario as pre-emptive (not overdetemined)
causation. Maybe some other military commander would have
stepped into Lubanga’s shoes had he declined the leadership
position, but that is quite different from the firing squad. Lubanga
did commit these crimes, and whether or not someone else would
have in the future is entirely speculative. As we will soon see, this
argument and the normative distinction it depends upon is one of
the key issues with which we must wrestle, but to foreshadow what
is to come, the distinction is more difficult to justify than first
meets the eye. Second, and equally importantly, Lubanga’s
example demonstrates that the conceptual problems with which we
will soon toil are not limited to crimes committed by “small fish.”
Lubanga was a leader at the head of a military unit responsible for
atrocities.
The arms vendor Viktor Bout, aptly nicknamed the Merchant
of Death, presents a fourth and final variant.10 After the end of the
Cold War, Bout trafficked guns to the most brutal conflicts with
reckless abandon. For example, at one point during the Angolan
war, UN Panels of Experts cited Bout as selling weapons to both
sides of a brutal conflict that had spanned four decades, killing at
least 500,000 civilians.11 Many years later, he would stand trial in
the United States for attempting to sell weapons to the FARC in
Colombia (which paralleled the Lubanga trial insofar as Bout’s
true criminal responsibility went seriously under-represented).12
9

Defence Closing Statements (Open Session), Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-T357), Trial Chamber I, August 26, 2011, 30, lines 2-5. I in no way vouch for the
factual veracity of this argument.
10
For an overview, see D. Farah and S. Braun, Merchant of Death: money, guns,
planes, and the man who makes war possible, (New York: Wiley, 2007);
discussing Bout’s various misadventures in the context of the arms trade
generally, A. Feinstein, The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade
(London: MacMillan, 2011), 154–164.
11
For engaging histories of the conflict, including the role of arms vendors and
extractive industries, see T. Hodges, Angola: the anatomy of an oil state. (2nd
ed. London: James Currey, 2004); K. Maier, Angola Promises And Lies
(London: Interlink, 2002). Estimates of deaths from the conflict range from
500,000 to 1.2 million people, with millions more displaced internally:
International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Angola’s Choice: Reform or Regress’ 61
Africa Report (Luanda/Brussels: ICG, 2003).
12
N. Rosenberg, 'Viktor Bout Guilty in Arms-Trafficking Case', The New York
Times, (2 November 2011), accessible at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/nyregion/viktor-bout-guilty-in-armstrafficking-case.html (last visited Jul 23, 2012).
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Subsequent to his conviction, Bout offered new reflections on his
earlier role in Angola. Predictably, he too explained away all
responsibility by appealing to the firing squad motif: “If I didn’t do
it, someone else would.”13 And it is difficult to contradict him,
knowing the global market in weaponry as we do.
Contrary to the other three examples, Bout is clearly an
accomplice. I am of the view that the accomplice liability of arms
vendors is philosophically defensible on an appropriate account of
complicity, although I accept that some would contest this.14
Indeed, after WWII, corporate officers were prosecuted as
accomplices for selling the means used to asphyxiate civilians at
Auschwitz,15 and modern courts have also begun to use complicity
to call businesspeople to account for knowingly transferring
weapons to recipients who use them to carry out atrocities.16
Unlike the surprisingly large mereological group of companies that
were prepared to do business with an apartheid regime that was
sanctioned, denounced and opposed throughout the West, only a
much smaller set of arms vendors could have sold weapons to
armed groups in Angola at the time. Bout was a pre-emptive
accomplice within a small mereological group.
How then does international criminal justice deal with the
various moral problems these examples engender? The answer is,
inadequately. At the level of doctrine, for accomplices such as
Bout, the position is that “[a]lthough the accused’s conduct need
not have been a condition sine qua non of the commission of the
13

N. Schmidle, 'Disarming Viktor Bout', The New Yorker (5 March 2012),
available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/03/05/120305fa_fact_schmidle (last
visited 4 June, 2012).
14
I concede that this point is not beyond dispute as a matter of criminal theory.
See R A Duff, “Can I help you?” accessorial liability and the intention to
assist, 10 LEGAL STUDIES 165–181 (1990) (arguing that using complicity in the
ordinary course of business is structurally akin to omission liability since it
requires the businessperson to break with their usual course of conduct). For
different views that use arms vendors as examples of accessorial liability, see
John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. LAW AND PHILOS. 127–141
(2007); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE
AGE (2000).
15
Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), British Military
Court, Hamburg, 1 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, 93 (March 8, 1946).
16
Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, Netherlands, LJN: BA6734, Gerechtshof ‘sGravenhage , 2200050906-2, (May 9, 2007) (charging Frans Van Anraat with
complicity in genocide and war crimes for selling chemical weapons to Saddam
Hussein, that were ultimately used to gas civilians); Prosecutor v.
Kouwenhoven, Netherlands, LJN: AY5160, Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage ,
09/750001-05 (July 28, 2006) (charging Guus Kouwenhoven with complicity in
international crimes perpetrated by Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia).
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crime, it must have made a difference.”17 And yet, as we will see,
this language means precious little. Moreover, for co-perpetrators
such as the Dresden pilots or the businesspeople operating in
apartheid South Africa, existing international criminal law requires
that each individual must make an ‘essential contribution…
resulting in the realization of the objective elements of the
crime.’18 And yet, perversely, neither an Allied pilot over Dresden
nor the businessperson in apartheid would satisfy these standards.
In any event, the core issue across all these examples is really
causal overdetermination, which presently goes unnoticed as courts
enthusiastically borrow ‘modes of liability’ from domestic legal
systems that do not deal with the problem squarely.
In fact, there is something quite peculiar about international
criminal justice as a discipline: causation has escaped direct
treatment by almost all courts and scholars.19 While we academics
have expended a considerable effort debating ‘modes of
liability’,20 very little debate has centered on more fundamental
concepts that apply regardless of how ‘modes of liability’ are
configured. This is undoubtedly true of causation. The problem is
that as soon as one begins the process of unveiling the concept and
its implications for international trials, one is immediately
confronted with the problem of overdetermination that has troubled
philosophers for centuries. Nonetheless, if international criminal
law is to be rational not intuitive, principled not arbitrary, all
variations of the problem require defensible solutions.
Causal overdetermination also strikes at the heart of
international criminal justice as a project. In recent years, many
scholars have come to the view that international criminal law’s
liberal commitment to locating responsibility in the individual is
17

Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez ("Kordić ") (IT-95-14/2-T), Trial
Chamber, 26 February 2001, § 391; Judgment, Prosecutor v. Blaškić (IT-95-14T), Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, § 270: “Although it must be proved that the
instigation was a clear contributing factor to the commission of the crime, it
need not be a conditio sine qua non.”.
18
Lubanga Trial Judgment, para. 925 “only those to whom essential tasks have
been assigned – and who, consequently, have the power to frustrate the
commission of the crime by not performing their tasks – can be said to have
joint control over the crime”.
19
For a helpful exception, see Darryl Robinson, How command responsibility
got so complicated: A culpability contradiction, its obfuscation, and a simple
solution, 13 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2012).
20
International criminal courts and tribunals use the term “modes of liability” to
designate participants in a crime. As I have argued elsewhere, the label is
conceptually misleading and of uncertain historical pedigree. Domestic systems
use the labels ‘participation’, ‘parties to a crime’ and more rarely, ‘modes of
attribution.’ Stewart, supra note 3, fn 2.
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unavoidably at odds with the collective character of atrocity.21 As
one of the very best of these scholars argues, “the collective nature
of atrocity sits uncomfortably with international criminal law’s
predicate of individual agency, action and authorship.”22 In turn,
this misgiving has led to serious skepticism about the value of
international criminal justice as a tool for promoting post-conflict
justice. Nevertheless, whether individual agency can adequately
cope with group offending largely depends on the strength of our
solutions to the problem of causal overdetermination, which goes
unexplored in the literature that too quickly declares individual
accountability inadequate.
In this essay, I introduce causal overdetermination and theories
proffered as solutions. Instead of advocating for one or another, I
hope to start a missing conversation by plotting the extent and
significance of these issues. To do this, Part I begins by
highlighting the structural origins of the problem and their genesis
in the idea that harm and therefore causation matter for
international criminal responsibility. In Part II, I then plot various
theories of causation, showing how ‘but for’ causation coupled
with a restraining auxiliary concept represents the dominant
understanding of causation in both theory and practice. With this
background behind us, Part III criticizes the positions adopted for
dealing with overdetermined causes in international and domestic
criminal courts alike, highlighting an alternative explanation that
shows greater promise while raising new concerns. What emerges
is a keen sense that this problematic cannot be easily resolved or
ignored.
II. THE STRUCTURAL ORIGINS OF THE CAUSATION IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW

21

George P. Fletcher, Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The
Problem of Collective Guilt, The, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1514 (2001) (“the liberal
bias toward individual criminal responsibility obscures basic truths about the
crimes that now constitute the core of international criminal law. [They] are
deeds that by their very nature are committed by groups and typically against
individuals as members of groups.”).
22
Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Postconflict Justice, in
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 23–60, 1 (Tracy Isaacs &
Richard Vernon eds., 2011). In fairness to Drumbl, he also raises a range of
other bases for his criticisms of individual criminal responsibility, including the
deeply conformist nature of most atrocities and the selectivity of trials that are
seriously under-inclusive of offenders.
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In the firing squad example with which we began, our core
concern was to isolate who was responsible for bringing about the
prisoner’s death given multiple sufficient causes. This raises a
preliminary structural question: why should making a difference to
harm matter in international criminal law at all? I begin then, by
situating the problem of overdetermination in the long debates
about whether causation should matter in determining criminal
responsibility. As will become apparent, doing so will later help in
elucidating why overdetermination is such a significant moral
problem, in pointing out the ways in which international criminal
justice has inadequately grappled with the challenge, and in
developing a new explanation of why these types of contribution
remain culpable despite the premise that the underlying criminal
harm would have transpired regardless of the conduct of any
specific accused.
Traditionally, criminal offenses are understood as dividing into
three distinct categories: inchoate crimes, such as attempt, where
the subjective disposition is the primary ground for responsibility;
conduct-type crimes, such as rape and fraud, where wrongdoing is
constituted by the conduct itself;23 and harm-type offences, such as
murder, where a potentially wide range of actions are prohibited if
they lead to proscribed harm.24 Under this latter category, lighting
a cigarette, driving a car, or watching television can serve as the
ground of responsibility,25 provided there is a causal relationship
between this conduct and a harm that is criminally prohibited.
Thus, for these harm-type crimes, the almost universal position in
extant criminal systems is that “a causal connexion between some
action of the accused and the specified harm must be shown in
order to establish the existence of liability.”26
Of course, there are those who deny this three-way division,
arguing that causation is a quintessential element of responsibility
23

I do not wish to be understood as implying that rape does not cause
devastating physiological and psychological harm. I have worked with victims
of mass rape. The conceptual point is merely that the occurrence of this harm is
not formally constitutive of rape as an offense, which I believe is appropriate.
What a horror it would be to have to prove that an act of sexual violence caused
a particular degree of physical or psychological harm for rape to be established.
24
Fletcher, supra note 21, at 388-390 (referring to patterns of manifest
criminality, harmful consequences and subjective criminality). I am grateful to
Thomas Weigend for pointing out how malleable these categories are.
25
M. Dan-Cohen, 'Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self', 105 Harvard
Law Review (1991) 959–1003, at 962. (using the term “ground of responsibility”
to distinguish object-responsibility and subject-responsibility).
26
H. L. A Hart and T. Honore Causation in the Law (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985), at 92 (emphasis in original).
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across all criminal offences. This argument is best made by
Michael Moore, who implores that “all complex descriptions of
actions share with ‘killing’ a built-in, second causal element: the
bodily movement (that is caused by a volition) must itself cause
some further, independent event to occur, like a death in the case
of ‘killing’.27 On this account, rape is not restricted to the conduct
of inserting one’s penis into a woman’s vagina without consent; it
is brought about by ‘causing sexual penetration of the female.’28 If
this reading of the philosophy of action is correct, one can never
escape causal analyses, even for what are commonly known as
conduct-type crimes. Thus, overdetermination affects all crimes,
not just harm type offences where causation is indisputably a
necessary ingredient of criminal responsibility.
Others reach the diametrically opposite view. If we are
committed to punishing people for what they deserve, surely they
should not benefit from their luck.29 Why, after all, should a
would-be murderer who shoots at her enemy be punished less,
merely because the victim by chance dies of a heart attack seconds
before the bullet hits?30 If we are serious about culpability as the
metric upon which to judge responsibility, we must eliminate these
types of fortuitous scenarios from our evaluations of guilt. We
therefore abolish harm as a morally relevant component of
criminal responsibility, and as a result, eliminate causation from
our criminal vocabulary. In its place, criminal offenses would
always be inchoate in structure (based on the inherit risk of
morally blameworthy actions), making each member of the firing
27

The criticism of the traditionalist division between conduct and harm type
offenses is best made in MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY:
AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 101 (2009); But see John
Gardner, Moore on Complicity and Causation, 156 U. PA L. REV. PENNUMBRA
432 (2008) (disagreeing that rape requires causation, because the offence
demands “no result... other than the action in question having been performed”).
28
MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW,
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS (2009).
29
For the classic discussion of this in English-speaking literature, see T. Nagel,
‘Moral Luck’, 50 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
(1976), 137-155; For more recent discussion, see A. Ashworth, ‘Taking the
Consequences’, in S. Shute, J. Gardner, & J. Horder (eds.), Action and Value in
Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press US, 1995), at 107; also see
L.Alexander, K.K. Ferzan and S. Morse. Crime and Culpability: A Theory of
Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 171-175.
30
For an excellent overview of these arguments, see L. Alexander and K. K.
Ferzan, supra note 29, at 171-196 (arguing that only culpability, not resulting
harm, affects desert"). For a response to these claims, which asserts the orthodox
position that harm matters, see M.S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An
Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), at 30.
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squad guilty of murder for firing the gun at the point they pull the
trigger. On this account, we solve the problem of
overdetermination by transcending the structure upon which it
depends.
And yet, international criminal law sides with neither extreme.
Like it or not, this particular criminal system unquestionably
makes causing harm a primary element of responsibility for many
crimes, from deportation as a crime against humanity to
genocide.31 Moreover, international courts often explicitly
reinforce the normative significance of harm by stating that many
international crimes are not inchoate and that liability is contingent
upon proof that the intended harm materialized.32 At the same
time, these courts are also unequivocal that for a conduct-type
crime such as public incitement to genocide, “a causal relationship
is not requisite to a finding of incitement.”33 For both these
reasons, our appreciation of the problem of overdetermination in
international criminal justice must defer to the manner in which
this set of crimes is constructed.
Moreover, there are compelling arguments in favor of this
partial reliance on causation, despite what exponents of the moral
luck school suggest. First, our basic intuitions about responsibility,
31

For the former, civilians must be expelled across a border; for the latter,
members of a civilian population must perish. For deportation, the ICC
Elements of Crimes stipulate that “[t]he perpetrator deported or transferred one
or more persons to another State or to another location.” Id., at 17. For the latter,
they indicate that one way of perpetrating the crime requires that “[t]he
perpetrator killed one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.” ICC Elements
of Crimes, at 6.
32
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Milutinoviæ et al., (IT-05-87-T), Trial Chamber, 26
February. 2009) at 92 (“liability for aiding and abetting under the Statute cannot
be inchoate: the accused cannot be held responsible under Article 7(1) for aiding
and abetting if a crime or underlying offence is never actually carried out with
his assistance, encouragement, or moral support.”); Judgment Prosecutor v.
Semanza, (ICTR-97-20-T), 15 May 2003, § 398 (“Article 6(1) does not
criminalize inchoate offences”.).
33
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1015
(Dec. 3, 2003); this aspect of the Trial Chamber’s reasoning was affirmed on
appeal. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., supra note 76, at 678; for a concise
articulation of the difference between instigation as mode of liability and
incitement as inchoate offence, see Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (June 20, 2009) (“Instigation under Article 6 (1) is a
mode of liability; an accused will incur criminal responsibility only if the
instigation in fact substantially contributed to the commission of one of the
crimes under Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute. By contrast, direct and public
incitement is itself a crime, requiring no demonstration that it in fact contributed
in any way to the commission of acts of genocide.”).
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naturally make causing harm a central component of the remorse
we feel for our actions. We would be appalled by someone who
treated negligent driving that killed an infant as merely a question
of poor driving, in the same way that we would view someone who
blamed themselves for killing an infant when they merely drove
negligently as psychically imbalanced.34 The reality is that
“[f]eelings of remorse and guilt are closely connected with causing
harm, for these feelings are part of a broader pattern of human
interaction.”35 Consequently, in order to maintain a close
intersection between morality and criminal responsibility, we have
to live with the unfortunate downside that is overdetermination.
Second, causation also preserves freedom, providing another
rationale for tolerating the problem. One of the primary concerns
in the literature on over-criminalization36 is the extent to which
conduct-type offenses that criminalize inherently risky behaviors
inhibit freedom of action. Take the criminalization of weapons
possession. Here, we prohibit possession because of its statistical
correlation with use for criminal ends, not because it is intrinsically
harmful. But many argue that a blanket crime of possession is
over-inclusive, given that it restricts the freedoms of those who
carry and use arms for non-criminal purposes.37 So by insisting on
a causal link between proscribed harm and actions of an accused,
international criminal justice offers only a minimalist intrusion into
the liberty of risky but otherwise socially desirable practices—
causation ensures that Bout is free to sell weapons to Angolans,
except where they cause atrocities.38
34

S. Wolf, 'The Moral of Moral Luck', in C. Calhoun ed. Setting The Moral
Compass Essays By Women Philosophers (New York: Oxford University Press,
2004), at 6..
35
G. Fletcher. Rethinking the Criminal Law, (London: Little, Brown, 1978) at
482 (note also Fletcher’s helpful criticisms of this position, questioning the
validity of using popular feelings of remorse as foundational for criminal
responsibility insofar as they may be the product of “neurotic guilt.”). This is
similar to John Gardner’s argument that using emotions as a basis for criminal
responsibility depends on how decent the emotions are. J. Gardner, Wrongdoing
by Results: Moore’s Experiential Argument (2012) 18 Legal Theory
(forthcoming) (citing irrational emotional prejudices against homosexuality as
an example of indecent emotions of this type).
36
S.H. Kadish. Blame and Punishment: Essays in the Criminal Law. (New
York; London: Macmillan, 1987), at 21-61; D.N. Husak. Overcrimininalization:
The Limits of the Criminal Law (New York: Macmillan, 2008).
37
For an excellent set of arguments to this effect, see D. N. Husak, 'Guns and
Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction,' 23 Law
and Philosophy (2004), 437–493.
38
I acknowledge that many would view selling weapons as categorically
socially undesirable, especially in the context of the Angolan War. I am not
prepared to follow the first of these arguments, because it denies the importance
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Third, causation may also be a practical necessity of proof. A
system of international criminal responsibility that abolishes
causation in favor of a structure that makes attempt the
paradigmatic basis for accountability would face severe difficulties
accessing relevant mental states. While it is often possible to
identify the person who has caused a harm, it is markedly more
difficult to isolate the class of people who entertained criminal
intentions towards others. Mental states, after all, ‘leave no
trace.’39 Consequently, demanding proof of causation ensures a
necessary degree of functional efficiency in the investigation and
proof of international crimes, while simultaneously preserving the
private internal life of potential defendants from undue
encroachment.40 If we aspire to liberal notions of punishment,
these are salutary characteristics.
Fourth, it is unclear to what extent those in the moral-luck
camp can really wash their hands of causation entirely. Invariably,
partisans of this theory still demand some action on the part of
defendants, usually defining it as an act that risks a criminalized
legal interest.41 Shooting a gun at another person is murder if this
action coincides with an intention to kill, regardless of whether
someone actually dies or not. On first blush, this is an astute
argument, which claims to dispense with causation while still
guarding against pure thought crimes. And yet, how do we know
that firing a gun qualifies as an act that increases the risk of
murder, except by drawing on our experience of the consequences
of speeding bullets puncturing the human body? We only know
that firing the gun is a plausible last-act for murder because
of weaponry in legitimate self-defense. Accordingly, I am tempted to think that
circumstances matter a great deal for the second argument too.
39
J. M. Fischer & R. H. Ennis, 'Causation and Liability,' 15 Philosophy and
Public Affairs (1986), 33–40; See also, V. Tadros. Criminal Responsibility
(Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2007), at 155; (“Given that what the
defendant has done cannot be established without considering what the
defendant has caused, it will be obvious that causation will be relevant to
determining the criminal responsibility of the defendant.”).
40
I extrapolate this position from Antony Duff’s argument that privacy and
autonomy are the primary rationale for why thought crimes are objectionable.
The addition of a causal element is my own. See A. Duff. Answering for Crime:
Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (New York: Hart Publishing,
2007), at 102–104. I accept, of course, that the requirement of intention still
requires courts to intrude on the internal lives of defendants. The argument here
is that causation reduces (but does not eliminate) the dangerousness of this
artificial but necessary exercise.
41
For instance, Alexander, Ferzan and Morse reject causation and require a lastact that unleashes a risk over which the defendant no longer has control. See
LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY:
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 197–199 (1 ed. 2009).
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intuitions derived from causation tell us as much, meaning that
causation is still doing important normative work no matter if we
formally repress this reality.42
How extensive is the problem of overdetermination then in
existing international criminal law? Superficially, we might
anticipate that the difficulty is localized in harm-type crimes, since
only these make causation a constitutive element of responsibility.
Lamentably, this is far from true. For accomplices, the
harm/conduct distinction disappears because the derivative nature
of the secondary party’s liability creates a cause-like relationship,43
through which overdetermination again rears its ugly head.
According to traditional accounts, rape is a conduct-type crime
(insofar as conduct and not consequence is the quintessence of the
offence), but assessing whether a supplier of weapons can be
convicted of rape for providing the weapons used to coerce the
sexual intrusion demands causation too. How else can we justify
convicting Bout of this particular war crime, other than by showing
that his actions made a difference to this conduct of a rapist? Thus,
we are again vulnerable to the rejoinder that these rapes would
have happened anyway.
Arguably, even the direct perpetration of conduct-type
offences can be overdetermined if they take place in a context
where one perpetrator is immediately substitutable for another. If,
for example, a particular soldier is ordered to rape a male inmate
within a prisoner of war camp, and duly does so in accordance
with these orders, is the claim that “it would have happened
whether I did it or not” not equally available to him where another
soldier would certainly have taken his place had he refused? This, I
concede, is controversial because it merges what Anglo-Americans
describe as overdetermination (the firing squad) with additional or
pre-emptive causation (someone else would have shot the prisoner
later had the firing squad not done so). The received wisdom is that
pre-emptive causation is very different because we never really
know how events would have transpired otherwise, but this
position fails to address squarely the moral appeal individuals like
Bout make to expiate themselves.
Similarly, even if these sorts of pre-emptive cases give rise to
what German theorists frequently discredit as ‘hypothetical
42

Viewed in this fashion, the act requirement offered by those who advocate
abandoning causation looks very similar to what German theorists call adequate
causation (Adaequanztheorie). This theory emphasizes the generic propensities
of particular actions. For further details, see below in Part II.
43
S.H. Kadish, ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine,’ 73 California Law Review (1985), 323-410, at 323, 327.
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causation,’44 I doubt whether this criticism is terribly well founded.
For one reason, causation is always hypothetical. In order to
determine the responsibility of the serial murderer who allegedly
kills an old lady with a gun, we must construct an imaginary world
that is identical to that in which the serial murdered acted as he did,
minus the squeezing of the trigger. Only this journey into a
fictitious world allows us to determine whether the serial murderer
caused the death of victims. So, when ICC Judge Fulford objects
that determining whether Lubanga made an essential contribution
to the enlistment of child solders requires ‘a hypothetical
investigation as to how events might have unfolded without the
accused’s involvement’,45 the obvious retort is that causation
always involves this retreat into the imaginary. We are operating in
hypothetical worlds either way.
Instead of belaboring the unavoidably speculative nature of this
exercise, the better explanation for why pre-emptive causation (e.g.
Bout) should be distinguished from overdetermination (e.g.
Dresden pilots) probably flows from assessing causation in a
minimally different world. In the words of David Lewis, in
determining whether a particular act or event is a cause of another,
the fictive world we construct “should be closest to actuality,
resembling itself more than any other world resembles it.”46
Consequently, our task should involve subtraction (of the
defendant’s actions) but not addition (of alternative possible
actions or events):47 otherwise we are left without any principled
normative restraint capable of preventing our imaginations from
running wild. So, the problem of overdetermination is formally
limited to situations such as Allied pilots bombing Dresden; not
Bout in Angola. In the former, the alternative Allied pilots were
also in the air dropping incendiaries over Dresden whereas
substitutes for Bout would probably have sold weapons through
other channels, at some later time.

44

C. Roxin Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil. Band I: Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der
Verbrechenslehre (4th edn., Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2006) at 354; K. Kühl,
Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (6th edn., Vahlen Franz GmbH, 2008), at 23.
45
Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fulford Judgement,
Lubanga, supra note 8, at § 17.
46
David Lewis, Causation, 70 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 556–567, 560
(1973). Of course, Lewis later retracted portions of his thinking on
overdetermined causes, and ultimately reached the position that all pre-emptive
causes are in fact overdetermined because of minimal relations between preempted and pre-empting causes. See David Lewis, Causation as Influence, 97
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 182–197, 189 (2000).
47
My thanks to Thomas Weigend for this point.
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Already, these illustrations should leave you feeling slightly
incredulous. What about pilots who are only over the English
Channel en route to Dresden, or arms vendors who are pressing
Angolan warlords to abandon Bout in an attempt to sell them their
cheaper more damaging weapons systems? The point is that even if
we can agree that those who merely pre-empt other people from
committing inevitable crimes do cause international crimes in the
relevant sense, we are still at pains to ascertain whether a particular
set of facts is pre-emptive or overdetermined. In fact, these sorts of
epistemic constraints lead two imminent theorists to perfectly
contradictory positions about the problem of overdetermination.
These competing accounts warrant our attention momentarily,
since they alert us to the epistemic difficulties that await even if we
are able to resolve first principles.
On the one hand, Martin Bunzl famously argues that every
supposed instance of overdetermination is really an example of
pre-emptive causation if one looks hard enough. 48 In the case of
the firing squad, one of the soldiers who shoots at the prisoner
actually kills her first. Sure, the difference between the first and
subsequent bullets penetrating the heart may only be a nanosecond,
but this difference is still significant if we are truly committed to
constructing minimally different worlds. To extrapolate, even in the
firestorm that raged over Dresden over those three horrendous
days, the fire that killed a given child was attributable to a
particular bomb, dropped by a single pilot with assistance from a
specific crew, on orders from an individual commander. While it
might be nigh on impossible to trace these individuals, the
evidential problem should not corrupt the deeper moral principle.
At the end of a distinguished career, David Lewis reached the
opposite conclusion—for Lewis, pre-emptive causes do not exist
and causation is always overdetermined.49 To illustrate his thesis,
Lewis used the example of a two people throwing stones at a glass,
although the firing squad would have served his purposes perfectly
too.50 In the stone-throwing example, the first stone hits the glass
ahead of the second, shattering the object completely. Thus, when
the second stone arrives at its intended destination, there is simply
no glass left to break. While many would claim that the first stone
caused the shattering, Lewis argues that the second stone’s flight
48

See M. Bunzl, 'Causal Overdetermination', 76 Journal of Philosophy (1979),
at 147 (“the illusion of causal overdetermination arises from nothing more than
the same epistemic constraints that make for difficulties in distinguishing causes
that preempt other causes.”).
49
Lewis, supra note 46.
50
Id. at 188–189.
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affects that of the first, by minimally influencing the gravitational
forces operative on it.51 To summarize a more sophisticated
argument, the event would have been different without the second
stone. Thus, both throwers caused the harm, even though it would
have materialized almost identically without either of them.
The implications are great. Our four variants of the problem
suggest that overdetermination arises even as we modulate
between harm-type or conduct-type crimes these individuals are
said to have assisted, between the different means of committing
international crimes across the full panoply of ‘modes of liability,’
and within structured organizations as well as mereological groups.
As such, overdetermination emerges as an acute problem for
international criminal justice because: causation is a quintessential
element of responsibility for international crimes in a great many
contexts; the epistemological difficulties in distinguishing preemptive causes from overdetermined causes are likely to be more
acute given the factual complexity of international cases, and
individual perpetrators of international crimes very frequently play
fungible roles within collective entities that guarantee the crime’s
commission.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THEORIES OF CAUSATION
In order to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the
various attempts at solving the problem of overdetermination, we
must first understand causation tout court. In setting out to acquire
this understanding, we are immediately struck by a stark
peculiarity about international criminal law: while “modes of
liability” may well lay claim to being the most discussed topic
within the discipline, more fundamental principles such as
causation attract little to no scholarly attention. Similarly, the only
real judicial reference to the concept usually reaffirms that
‘[a]lthough the accused’s conduct need not have been a condition
sine qua non of the commission of the crime, it must have made a
difference.’52 As we will explore later, this language is opaque to
the point of meaninglessness, but in order to understand why, we
must first explore the competing explanations of cause and effect
that could underpin this explanation. What is sine qua non
causation and what are we left with if we discard it?
51

Id. at 189.
Kordić, supra note 17 at § 391; Prosecutor v. Blaškić , supra note 17 at § 270
(“Although it must be proved that the instigation was a clear contributing factor
to the commission of the crime, it need not be a conditio sine qua non.”).
52
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Most often, causation is understood as a counterfactual
relationship between two connected events. “But for” event A,
event B would never have occurred. This understanding springs
from widely held moral intuitions—the imperative do no harm lies
at the heart of many visions of moral obligation. We have free rein
to craft whatever constitutes our own vision of the good life, but
we remain constrained by the minimalist obligation to ensure that
we do not bring harm into the world. As Michael Moore explains,
‘[w]hat gets recorded in our moral ledgers are the bad states of
affairs that would not have existed but for our actions.’53 And an
understanding of the natural effects of ‘impacts, blows, and gross
mechanical movements’ that is instilled in us from a very young
age normally leaves us with a clear picture that making a
difference to events matters in determining blame.54 Accordingly,
whether actions are a sine qua non for criminal harms is the
dominant yardstick for determining causation.
This immediately poses problems. While our primary interest
lies in situations where the sine qua non assessment leaves too
much out, the major influence on causal theory stems from the
test’s failings in the opposite extreme. Counterfactual causation is
over-inclusive in two dimensions. First, it makes even distant
conditions of a particular event relevant to responsibility. To cite a
neat and often-used example, consider the responsibility of a serial
murderer’s grandmother—but for her decision to procreate the
better part of a century earlier, the murder of numerous innocents
would never have transpired at the hands of her progeny.55 But by
including the grandmother in our account of these gruesome
crimes, we extend causation beyond the point of plausibility,
establishing a kind of reductio ad absurdum for the ‘but for’
standard that dominates causal theory.
Second, coincidences also undermine the merit of ‘but for’
causation. In a range of cases, an entirely unforeseeable occurrence
can derail an actor’s causal influence from its pre-established path.
If I shoot my estranged lover intending to kill her, but my bullet
only grazes her leg, am I really responsible for murder when she is
later killed by a bolt of lightning on the way to the hospital?56 My
actions are certainly a ‘but for’ condition of her death, and yet the
53

Moore, supra note 28, at 317.
H.L.A. Hart and T. Honoré, supra note 26, at 15-16.
55
J. Stapleton, 'Perspectives on Causation,' in Jeremy Horder ed., Oxford Essays
in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 67.
56
For three other interesting variants of this problematic, see J. Feinberg, Harm
to Others: the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 2nd edn., (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), at 122.
54
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result I contributed to bringing about is so attenuated from the
direct consequences of my own conduct, that blaming me for
murder seems to miscommunicate events as they really transpired.
For most, I did not really cause my ex-lover’s death in the
operative sense, and calling me to answer for these entirely
anomalous results runs counter to the rationales for causation in
criminal law that we considered earlier.
In response, the most prominent causal theories simply append
additional limiting criteria to compensate for the overly
promiscuous ‘but for’ standard. In Anglo-American systems, this
approach has led to the bifurcation of causation into two conjoint
elements, namely, cause in fact and legal causation. The first
allows for a “purely scientific” inquiry on factual grounds based on
the “but for” standard, thus including the serial murderer’s
grandmother and my actions leading to my ex-lover’s death by
lightning. The second evaluative limb excludes these scenarios,
frequently by somewhat misleadingly describing them as either
“inadequately proximate” or “too remote.”57 To be sure, a range of
alternative concepts, from substantial factor to harm-within-therisk, claim to achieve this limiting function more fairly,58 but each
of these exists in the shadows of the more popular notion of
proximate cause.
This duality also exists in orthodox German theory. According
to the prevalent ‘theory of conditions’ (Bedingungstheorie), all
conditions are formally equal, making ‘but for’ causation the most
favored basic test. Instead of a notion of proximate cause or
remoteness, however, the German tradition constrains the
overreach of the sine qua non standard by relying on a concept
called ‘normative attribution’ (objektive Zurechnung).59 Normative
57

For a more historical analysis of proximate cause in the Anglo-American
tradtion, see J.A. McLaughlin 'Proximate Cause,' 39 Harvard Law Review, 149–
199; for a précis of the abundant criticism of both concepts, see Hart and
Honoré supra note 15 at 4 (refering to “insufficient proximity” and “too remote”
as illusions, and citing dicta from the 19th century arguing that both concepts
merely camouflage the real question of whether it is fair to convict the accused
in the circumstances). H. Morris, Freedom and Responsibility: Readings in
Philosophy and Law (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), at 284.
(discussing the widely held view that proximate cause “is simply a ‘policy
decision’ disguised as a factual discovery”.).
58
For an excellent overview and criticism of these various options, see Moore,
supra note 28 at III (discussing foreseeability, harm-within-the-risk, substantial
factor and remoteness); See also, R. Wright 'Causation in Tort Law,' 73
California Law Review (1985), 1759–1773 (also discussing several theories for
limiting the scope of sine qua non causation).
59
C. Roxin Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil. Band I: Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der
Verbrechenslehre (4th edn., Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2006) at 372; H.
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attribution filters out causal contributions that were minor, remote,
unusual or involved third party interventions of a particular
intensity based on notions of fairness. As one international
criminal tribunal put it, normative attribution ‘is a means of
limiting “naturalistic causality.”’60 If one might again protest that,
like the equivalent concept of legal causation in English-speaking
systems, these standards are hopelessly vague, the essential point
for present purposes is that neither legal tradition allows “but for”
causation free rein—both employ supplementary doctrine out of
fear that an unbridled concept of “but for” causation will overstep
what is fair.
There is, however, an array of theories that contest these
cumbersome and ill-defined twin standards. One set of alternatives
overcomes the imperfections of the “but for” test and its restraining
partner by disputing the validity of the cause in fact/legal causation
dichotomy outright. In the English-speaking tradition, H.L.A Hart
and Tony Honoré authored the most famous attempt of this sort.
For Hart and Honoré, common sense was the shining light that
illuminated a defensible understanding of causation and its limits;
not abstract philosophical, scientific or open-textured principles
that struggled for concrete articulation. This appeal to common
sense (to be established through the hypothetical ordinary citizen)
leads inexorably to the conclusion that the cause of a criminal
harm is the condition that makes a difference, in that it either
constitutes a voluntary human act intended to bring about the
harm, or is an abnormal action, event or condition that is itself the
real cause of a harm.
There is undoubtedly much that commends this explanation. In
a democratic system where criminal norms purport to put would-be
defendants on notice of potentially important intrusions on
individual liberty, the everyday perceptions of citizens matter as
metrics for defining causation. The great merit of the common
sense approach, quite apart from simplifying an oftentimes
spectacularly complex philosophical literature, is that it champions
the standard a potential criminal would employ.61 And yet, for a
number of reasons, the common-sense approach has not garnered
widespread adherence since its academic inception. For one
Koriath, Kausalität und Objektive Zurechnung (1st edn., Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2007), at 15 (discussing the implications of normative attribution); M. Maiwald
Kausalität und Strafrecht. Studien zum Verhältnis von Naturwissenschaft und
Jurisprudenz (Munich: Grundlegend, 1980), at 4-5, 9.
60
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Orić, (IT-03-68-T), Trial Chamber, 30 June 2006, at
305.
61
P.K. Ryu, 'Causation in Criminal Law,' (1958) 106 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 773-805, at 786.
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reason, if criminal justice uses causation to achieve corrective
justice (i.e. you account for the harm you caused), justice demands
“a robustly metaphysical interpretation of cause,”62 not some
definition that accords with popular perceptions as a matter of
convenience.
Moreover, the common-sense standard of causation does not
appreciably alter the fluid state of legal causation it was crafted to
transcend. As Paul Ryu colorfully retorted soon after Hart and
Honoré’s groundbreaking first edition emerged, ‘common sense
(or the test applied by the common man) compares with scientific
thinking as sight estimates size compared with scientific
measure.’63 So conferring cause a meaning that best suits the clearcut resolution of disputes, the need for simplicity or popular
expectations may have some beneficial sociological consequences,
but it misspeaks responsibility by trading off the meaning of a
concept that arguably has a unique metaphysical significance this
account does not attempt to honor, and ultimately, is no less
equivocal than the vague notion of legal causation it was invented
to replace. Others will refute this, of course, but these perceptions
do explain the very limited purchase of common sense in this field.
Other theories of causation attempt different solutions to these
problems, but they are no more successful in dethroning the
dominant ‘but for’ test. The theory of adequate causation
(Adaequanztheorie) is arguably the strongest among these
contending accounts.
Here, contrary to the individualized
assessment of causation involved in the “but for” analysis,
adequate causation is only established where the action in question
was of a type adequate to produce the harm generated.64 My
shooting at my ex-lover was not the type of action that was capable
of producing death by lightning, meaning that my responsibility
should be limited to that of attempting her murder.65 Whereas ‘but
for’ causation undertakes causal inquiries one by one in perfect
hermetic isolation, adequate causation limits this over-reach,
62

M. Moore, supra note 27, at 95. But for an excellent criticism of the notion
that causation has any inherent metaphysical character, see Stephen J. Morse,
The Moral Metaphysics of Causation and Results, 88 CAL. L. REV. 879 (2000).
63
Ryu, supra note 61 at 786.
64
Hart and Honoré, supra note 26 at 411 (introducing adequate causation,
including the focus on kinds of connections); Ryu, supra note 61 at 791–792
(also introducing adequate theory of causation).
65
Note how this circles us back into our earlier debate about whether harm is a
conceptually meaningful ingredient of responsibility. If it is not, it is hard to
understand why attempts should be treated as involving lesser responsibility.
Thus, on my lightning example, some would argue that I am equally responsible
whether my ex-lover dies by my bullet or an entirely unforeseen electrocution.
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assessing these issues by deferring to an action’s generic
propensities.66 I am not responsible for murdering my estranged
lover because shooting is generally inadequate as a cause of death
by lightning.
But this theory has major shortcomings too. Surely a defendant
would have to know of typical propensities in order to be fairly
held responsible for them? As a result, the most popular iteration
of adequacy theory demands that the accused knew the particular
factors (ontological knowledge) and the pertinent general laws of
nature (nomological knowledge).67 Any yet, for many, these
requirements are unpalatable. By introducing a mental element into
a test devised to ascertain purely physical phenomena, they
arguably force distinct concepts into an unhappy union. Thus, with
certain exceptions, most courts flatly reject the concept because of
this tendency to pollute the division between physical action and
guilt.68 This factor alone tends to confirm adequate causation’s
long-endured place as the underappreciated sibling of the more
popular ‘but for’ alternative.
What then of the concept of efficient causation? Various
versions of this theory posit that quantitative assessments of
causation are capable of singling out the one true cause from the
sea of necessary conditions. For some partisans, the one true cause
is the last condition in a temporal sequence prior to the prohibited
result’s manifestation in the world; the preponderant factor that
‘disrupts the equilibrium between positive and negative
conditions.’69 Others contend that whatever has the greatest or
most efficient influence on the result constitutes the cause, denying
that order in sequence need necessarily constitute the decisive
factor. To illustrate, if ten blows of precisely the same force are
necessary to kill a particular prisoner of war, and soldier A delivers
eight of them before soldier B independently delivers the final two,
66

Hart and Honoré, supra note 26 (describing generalized theories of causation
in the following terms: “They seek rather a general connexion between a
condition and a subsequent event in the sense of a relation which will hold good
although the condition is combined with a varying set of other conditions.”).
67
Ryu, supra note 61 at 791–792.
68
See in particular, the decision of the German Bundesgerichtshof, (Federal
Court of Justice) judgment of Sept. 28 1951 in S. v. H. (II. Strafsenat), , 1
B.G.H.S. at 332. (rejecting adequate causation within German criminal law). For
other examples of courts adopting the adequacy theory, albeit some time ago,
see Id. at 792–793; Hart and Honoré, supra note 26 at 417 (setting out various
continental systems that accepted adequate causation in their criminal or civil
systems).
69
K. Binding. Die Normen und ihre übertretung: Eine untersuchung über die
rechtmässige handlung und die Arten des Delikts (1st edn., Leipzig: Verlag Von
Wilhelm Engelmann, 1877), at 470.
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the efficient theory holds soldier A responsible, the preponderant
theory declares soldier B the cause for making the final difference.
And yet, singularizing quantitative theories of causation such
as these, that attempt to distil the one true cause of an event, seem
inappropriately narrow for international criminal law. Aside from
the persistent concern that these theories too are badly
indeterminate,70 efficient and last-cause understandings of
causation struggle to make any real sense of the cases that concern
us here. With respect to the Dresden bombers who are principal
perpetrators, the many Viktor Bouts of this world who are
accomplices, and the corporate officers who willingly sustain
morally bankrupt political regimes who may be either perpetrators
or accomplices, responsibility cannot be reduced to the act of a
single agent. In other words, we are committed to the idea that
responsibility for atrocity is diffused across numerous actors—
masterminds, accomplices and executioners. For international
crimes then, the quest for a single cause is at odds with our deepest
intuitions about justice after events as complex as atrocity. Thus,
we are drawn away from ideas about efficient causes back towards
the more inclusive concept of ‘but for’ causation that captures all
these actors.
This said, efficient causation is helpful in introducing a slightly
controversial proposition that has (somewhat mysteriously)
infiltrated modern international criminal law. The idea is that
causal contributions must be ‘substantial.’71 At first blush, this
quantitative vision of causation sits uncomfortably with the theory
of conditions that underpins the popular “but for” standard. If all
causes are equal, how are some more potent than others? An action
is either a cause of an event or it is not, so how do you make a
substantial contribution when causation is an on or off switch? The
answer again lies in the notion that not all causes count for
responsibility—some are too distant, weak or bizarre. So, in
accordance with metaphysics that view causal relations as scalar,
70

Even one of the most ardent advocates of the efficiency theory of causation
has conceded that precise criteria are not available to filter out efficient from
non-efficient causes. M. von Buri Die Kausalitat und ihre strafrechtlichen
Beziehungen (Stuttgart: 1885), at 7-9.
71
Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, (IT-95-14/2-A), Trial Chamber, 17
December 2004, § 27 (“it is sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was a
factor substantially contributing to the conduct of another...”); Judgment,
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. (ICTR-99-52-A), 28 November 2007 § 410
(specifying that genocide and crimes against humanity “require evidence of a
substantial contrbution.”); Judgment, Prosecutor v. Brima, (SCSL 04-16-T), 20
June 2007, § 1648 (2007) (requiring a substantial contribution for the purposes
of planning international crimes).
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causal force is a variable property of events that can ‘peter out
gradually by transmission through events.’72
Where does modern international criminal law stand on these
various competing visions of causation? It is still too early to say.
Frequently, difficult causal problems are simply abandoned under
the guise of prosecutorial burdens of proof,73 and little is known
about how courts will address these contradictory explanations in
trials involving international crimes. Assuming that international
courts will follow domestic systems’ lead, however, the ‘but for’
test would seem likely to infiltrate international criminal
proceedings, in tandem with an auxiliary concept of normative
attribution or its equivalent. This likelihood arises from
international criminal law’s sometimes unconditional deference to
the position adopted in leading Western municipal systems,74 but it
will also flow from a desire to assess more than a single strain of
causal influences on atrocity. Consequently, everything suggests
that overdetermination, the under-inclusive flipside of ‘but for’
causation, is likely to enjoy a long and troublesome life in
international criminal justice.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF OVERDETERMINATION AND ITS SOLUTIONS
Let us begin our exploration of possible solutions for the
overdetermination problem by recapitulating the various examples
with which we began. In the first, the fire bombing of Dresden by
close to 8,000 Allied pilots provided a paradigmatic illustration
closest to the firing-squad motif. As part of this aerial campaign,
no individual pilot made a difference to the firestorm that would
have resulted without their token contribution. Put differently, we
can subtract the contribution of each and every pilot in a trial for
say crimes against humanity as counterfactual causation would
demand, but this leaves us with the implausible result that these
72
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crimes are the fault of no one. This, as we have seen, highlights
how the actions of even those personally perpetrating crimes can
be overdetermined in the relevant sense—the problem is not
limited to accomplices on any plausible rendering.
Thomas Lubanga offered a second potential variation on this
truth, even if some would contest his inclusion here. If Lubanga’s
defence is true, then his involvement in the recruitment of
Congolese child soldiers was arguably overdetermined too, even
though he is also probably best described as a perpetrator not an
accomplice. To recall, Lubanga argues that the members of the
rebel group he represented did not ‘need him to carry out these
crimes.’75 I accept that some would describe this as pre-emptive
causation i.e. Lubanga completed the crime before someone else,
so you cannot assimilate this to the firing-squad metaphor. But
even if we take seriously the idea that we are only to construct a
minimally different world to test what would have happened
without a defendant’s conduct, “one should not erroneously infer
that [various tests for causation] will blind us to the causal role of
dispositions or inclinations.”76 If others had inclinations to fill
Lubanga’s shoes, might his conduct not be overdetermined?
The actions of businesspeople in apartheid South Africa were
doubly overdetermined. On one level, a robust global market
makes the acts of any one company in the apartheid regime
fungible for other companies would willingly play this role if any
one corporation defects. On a second level, a single vote on a
corporate board of, say, fifteen members seldom makes a
difference to the actions of the company. If a company’s board
passed a motion to assist apartheid crimes by a bare minimum (i.e.
8 votes to 7 in this hypothetical), then each board member who
cast an affirmative vote did make a difference to the downstream
consequences, but in any other voting configuration, the company
would have acted as it did regardless of any individual vote. How
then do we hold these businesspeople responsible, when almost no
consequence can be pinned on any individual using the prevalent
understanding of causation?
Viktor Bout offers a slight variation on this theme. In the case
of businesses operating in apartheid South Africa, the willing
substitutes are numerous and barriers to entry marginal. In Viktor
Bout’s case, he forms part of a much smaller group of individuals
who would or could run weapons to Angola in the midst of this
bloodshed (for reasons that become apparent further below).
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Moreover, ascertaining whether someone else would have filled
this role is more speculative in Bout’s case, given the extent of
these impediments. For these reasons, Bout’s argument that ‘If I
didn’t do it, someone else would,”’77 falls within the rubric of preemptive causation, and contravenes our minimally different world
test. Nonetheless, if his contribution is neutral in consequentialist
terms in that others would have done more or less identically, we
are still left with the vexing task of justifying his responsibility for
international crimes that require causation. Moreover, these issues
not only arise in formal organizations; Bout shows how they are
salient for mereological groups such as arms vendors that have no
joint agenda.
Jonathan Glover makes the task of justifying accountability in
these contexts even harder still. In a beautiful articulation of the
scale of the ethical dilemma (that coincidentally uses arms
manufacturers and businesses in apartheid as illustrations), he
questions whether it is really safe to claim that overdetermined
contributions are neutral in consequentialist terms.78 The problem
is much worse. The side effects of declining to participate in evil
may bring an added set of negative consequences, without
impacting upon the advent of the atrocity. To return to Dresden,
the Allied pilots whose troubled consciences led them to drop their
ordinance over vacant fields outside the city rather than participate
in the horror could have faced court martial, loss of earnings for
their family, or major impediments to their careers over the longer
term. If the massacre at Dresden was going to unfold anyway,
would these side effects not favor participation absent an ability to
actually make a difference to the atrocity?
This is surely sobering. The reasoning implies that if we cannot
point to a meaningful difference our conduct would make relative
to massive harm, and a set of countervailing side effects favor
implicating oneself to at least avoid these peripheral negativities,
the only reason to refuse participating in evil might derive from a
strange sort of narcissistic pride.79 So to place this set of reflections
back into the context of modern international criminal law, the
77
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major conceptual problem in the famed Erdemović case (where
other executioners threatened the life of a fellow soldier who did
not wish to participate in the execution of thousands of men and
boys at Srebrenica) is less whether international law afforded
Erdemović a defense of duress,80 and more whether criminal law
could justifiably hold him responsible for causing crimes that
would have certainly transpired regardless. In Glover’s terms, even
minor negative side effects could favor participation in these
inevitable crimes, even though they create pressures that are well
short of duress.
To date, international criminal justice has offered only a
shallow treatment of these disquieting problems. Most frequently,
the only real engagement is tacit, when international courts repeat
the refrain that ‘[a]lthough the accused’s conduct need not have
been a condition sine qua non of the commission of the crime, it
must have made a difference.’81 As I suggested earlier, this
language lacks any appreciable meaning. If the phrase implies that
a theory of causation other than ‘but for’ causation better explains
the relationship between action and result in international criminal
justice, courts should announce which less popular theory of
causation is doing the hidden causal work. As I argued in Part II,
there are compelling reasons why sine qua non is the dominant test
for causation in theory and practice almost everywhere, not to
mention strong grounds for its retention in international criminal
justice in particular. If international courts are going to stray from
this path, they should at least announce as much and elect one of
the competing theories we have considered.
Alternatively, if this language implies that there is some way of
making a difference to something without causing it, the test fails
for other reasons. First, it unjustifiably dispenses with causation,
when this concept is made necessary by the definition of
international crimes. In Part I, we saw that causation is a prerequisite for responsibility in international criminal justice because
international criminal law creates harm-type offenses, and because
secondary parties often bear causal relations to the physical
perpetrators of conduct-type offenses they assist. One cannot
80
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discard causation in these contexts without miscommunicating
what it means to be responsible for an international crime, so if the
standard test means that causation is not required, it creates an
expressive contradiction.
Second, making a difference without causing something is
logically nonsensical since “there is no way of contributing to any
result, directly or indirectly, except causally.”82 So even if we
overlooked this test’s first infidelity to the international crimes
with which it partners, this second flaw confirms that the approach
is more a smokescreen to prevent detection than a good-faith
philosophical attempt at accounting for the moral problem. On
either reading of this language, then, the test fails to offer a
position that is commensurate with the challenge that
overdetermined causes pose for international criminal justice as a
discipline. This realization should spark better solutions for a
problem of this importance, if we are to apply principles of blame
attribution that are justified not intuitive, arbitrary and illiberal.
Perhaps domestic criminal systems offer better solutions?
Unfortunately, I fear not. In both Anglo-American and German
systems, the preferred strategy for dealing with overdetermined
causes modifies counterfactual causation by assessing events as
they actually transpired.83 The supposition is that the harms in
Angola or before the metaphorical firing squad can be defined in a
sufficiently precise way that the sorts of difficulties
overdetermination engenders simply dissolve. In the words of John
Mackie, ‘[w]hat we accept as causing each result, though not
necessary in the circumstances for that result described in some
broad way, was necessary in the circumstances for the result as it
came about.’84 So, we should not evaluate whether our prisoner up
against a brick wall would have died but for the actions of any one
soldier in the firing squad; the question is, would she have died as
she did?
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Alas, this solution does not work either. First, by adopting an
understanding of causation based on events as they actually took
place, we would have to describe a woman who paints a vase blue
before someone else smashes it as a cause of the vase’s
destruction.85 After all, if the painter had not done as she did, the
event would not have occurred as it took place, since the shattered
pieces of porcelain left on the floor would be an entirely different
color.86 The implications of this objection are broad—the
manufacturer of the t-shirt our prisoner is wearing when executed
by the firing squad becomes a cause of the death,87 since the event
would have materialized quite differently after subtracting the
clothing through which the bullet passed in the death that really
took place.
Second, if as it took place includes a temporal component,
everything is causally relevant to everything else. For example, it
we offer a fine-grained account of Viktor Bout’s complicity in
atrocities that took place in Angola, a key property of the event
was that they transpired in 1992. But time is a relational property
of events, making Bout’s criminally indifferent actions in Angola
and every prior event causally linked. Consequently, Boris Becker
was a causal contribution for Bout’s crimes in Angola too, since
his inaugural win at Wimbledon in 1985 had a precise temporal
relationship with the fine-grained explanation of how Bout’s
crimes took place seven years later.88 So in resorting to the finegrained explanation of causation to overcome the shortcomings in
the sine qua non theory of causation, we collapse into a standard
whose breadth is without limit.
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Third, a range of authors from different traditions object that
the harm as it took place standard already posits the solution that
causal inquiry exists to provide. In the German tradition, Friedrich
Dencker concludes that using the concrete result adopts a condition
for the description of the event that one already is certain about,
which he rightly rejects as a circularity.89 Similarly, in addressing
the firing-squad example explicitly, Christopher Kutz argues that
‘[t]he trouble with this approach is that by identifying effects by
their causes, it solves questions of overdetermination by
tautology.’90 Each of these criticisms plays off the fact that we do
not include the manufacturer of the t-shirt the prisoner was wearing
at the moment of execution because we believe it causally
irrelevant, but this impermissibly assumes the answer that we look
to causation to provide.
Ultimately, the various criticisms of harm as it took place alert
us to a remarkable three-way convergence among purportedly
conflicting accounts of criminal responsibility. In the first instance,
the fine-grained solution to overdetermination that assesses harm
as it actually took place is so broad as to make causation an
irrelevance in assigning responsibility. If Boris Becker’s first win
at Wimbledon is a causal factor in Viktor Bout’s responsibility for
international crimes in Angola, causation loses all meaning as an
ingredient in responsibility. This, ironically, coincides with the
conclusion Christopher Kutz reaches after admonishing causation’s
inability to cope with overdetermined causes—in both instances,
causation plays no part.91 To complete the curious merger, these
approaches also coincide with arguments that moral luck interdicts
causation in the criminal law as a blanket rule. Although each of
these approaches differ, their implication is identical—causation
does no work in assigning responsibility for overdetermined
harms.
This exposes a deep schizophrenia in international criminal
justice. As things stand, the dominant theory for establishing
responsibility for overdetermined causes in international justice is
at odds with core commitments. Each of the arguments for
89

F. Dencker, Kausalität und Gesamttat (1st edn., Munich: Duncker & Humblot,
1996), at 106-107. In this spirit, see also Eric Hilgendorf, Zur Lehre von “Erfolg
in seiner konkreten Gestalt,' 142 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (1995),
515-524 (arguing that the “concrete result” is without fixed outline and
indeterminate.).
90
Kutz, supra note 1 at 285, footnote 33. Wright, supra note 58 at 1777–1778
(also describing the attempt to describe the effort to detail the manner of
occurrence for purposes of calculating causation as tautology).
91
Christopher Kutz, Causeless complicity, 1 CRIMINAL LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
289–305 (2007).

30

2012]

OVERDETERMINED ATROCITIES

maintaining harm as a ground of liability finds a counterpoint in
the intricacies of overdetermination. First, the evidential point
about mental states ‘leaving no trace’ is clearly inapposite for
overdetermined cases, since ex hypothesi there is no necessary
correlation between result and any one individual’s actions in these
circumstances. And second, to some extent, feelings of remorse
can be assuaged by Lubanga’s countervailing sense that ‘I wasn’t
needed for the crime,’ or even more problematically, the
knowledge that the world is better off that this inevitable evil came
into being through me.
This said, someone is surely responsible for the Dresden
firebombing! Participation in atrocity is surely sufficient, and the
cases of Bout, Lubanga, Dresden pilots, and businesspeople in
apartheid corroborate this moral intuition with spectacular
intensity. Perhaps, then, instead of throwing up our hands in
surrender to the incoherence of standards domestic courts tolerate
or prematurely amputating the infected concept entirely,
international criminal courts should seek out new explanations for
what it means to cause an atrocity. In the context of their work, this
would mean discarding the hopelessly hollow statement
‘[a]lthough the accused’s conduct need not have been a condition
sine qua non of the commission of the crime, it must have made a
difference,’92 in favor of a more robust holistic theory of causation
that better accounts for individual agency within collective
structures.
For some, this theory is already on offer. In recent years, a
theory called necessary element of a sufficient set (NESS) has
gained ascendancy in modern English-speaking systems, precisely
because of its perceived success in resolving the overdetermination
riddle. This particular theory was originally introduced by Hart and
Honoré on the backs of Hume and John Stuart Mill, but later
expanded and popularized by Richard Wright.93 The formal
definition of NESS that “a particular condition was a cause of
(condition contributing to) a specific consequence if and only if it
was a necessary element of a set of antecedents actual conditions
that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence.”94 The
key word in all this is “actual”. In the case of the Dresden
bombers, each pilot made a necessary contribution to a sufficient
92
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set of antecedent conditions that produced the actual firestorm. In
essence, they all caused these murders by acting in unison.
What about the board members of companies in apartheid
South Africa? To recall, according to the “but for” evaluation, any
vote within a board other than a bare majority (i.e. 8 out of 15
votes) creates serious problems of causal overdetermination—each
board member could rightly argue that her contribution in voting to
do business with an apartheid government made no difference to
that outcome. Under the NESS analysis, however, a vote of say 14
affirmative votes involves 14 distinct contributions to the actual
set of conditions sufficient to propel the company into a role in
sustaining a system of institutionalized racism.95 So, claim
adherents, NESS causation ably accounts for the Dresden-type
harm where joint action produces an exact quantum of harm as
well as overdetermined participation in voting structures where
harm presupposes the attainment of a particular threshold. NESS
factors thus appear to outperform their more established
predecessor.
And yet NESS would treat Bout and Lubanga differently. In
both these instances, the NESS analysis purportedly excludes these
types of argument on the familiar distinction between pre-emptive
and truly overdetermined causes, without explaining why this
distinction is operative or how we go about distinguishing between
them. In the case of Thomas Lubanga, it may well have been true
that the militia that recruited child soldiers into their ranks did not
need him for that purpose and that his contribution to the enterprise
was less than essential, but the supposition is that this requires
more than a minimal imaginary world. As Richard Wright would
argue, “[t]he potential actions of others that did not in fact occur
could not be a part of any set of actual antecedent conditions that
was sufficient for the injury.”96 The evil did come through
Lubanga, and yet NESS theorists still leave us guessing why this
should be normatively important if the disposition of others
confirm that someone else would certainly have taken his place.
How would a NESS factor function in international criminal
law? For all its possible advantages, I also fear a collapse into a
familiar indeterminacy. The real work NESS does involves
drawing boundaries around sufficient sets of conditions, then
holding anyone accountable (subject to other elements of blame
attribution) who participated in this set. In cases involving massive
95
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social upheaval, the prospects for massive sufficient sets for crimes
that are dependent on broad collective participation are very real.
In fact, this has proved one of the central points of contention
around joint criminal enterprise in international criminal justice:
sure, one can say an entire army of soldiers, government
representatives and political supporters were engaged in a joint
criminal enterprise,97 but at some point people begin to fear this
means ‘just convict everyone.’98 Two examples demonstrate
comparable difficulties for NESS causation.
First, the war ICC indictee Thomas Lubanga was fighting in
the Democratic Republic of Congo was motivated and fuelled by
the illegal exploitation of natural resources by Western
companies.99 At a particular point, the closure of an industrial plant
in Australia made the Eastern DRC the only place in the world
where the mineral coltan could be extracted. This mineral, which is
essential in laptop computers, game consoles and cellphones, is
readily harvested by artisanal minerals, making it an ideal means
of financing atrocity in the post-Cold War world. Immediately
prior to Christmas in 2001, the demand for next generation
electronics in Western markets saw prices in the region Thomas
Lubanga operated rise 1000%, sparking a massive increase in
atrocities as warring factions vied for dominance over extractive
sites.100 Does this market in pillaged commodities, which is
dependent on a very large sufficient set of willing Western
consumers, make these consumers responsible for the resulting
crimes?101
Second, the reason Viktor Bout was so unrepentantly selling
weapons to every brutal regime on the earth for more than a
decade, was because Western governments supported him in the
97
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endeavor. The motivation for their collaboration was obvious;
when they had to transfer weapons covertly on the grey market,
they depended on established black-market dealers such as Bout to
give their covert transfers the clandestine veneer necessary.102 In a
democratic system like the United States (to name only one of
Bout’s trusted supporters), the decision of political leaders to
support someone such as Bout despite his actions in Angola might
implicate a massive sufficient set of all American citizens who
voted for these political representatives.103 Without this sufficient
set’s vote, the leaders could not have acted thus, and Bout would
have enabled the murder of fewer Africans.104 Is this, after all, so
far from the example of corporate board members in Apartheid
South Africa, just with membership of the board expanded
exponentially?
To bring this back into our earlier analysis of causation, the
NESS factor became popular because it dispensed with the need to
show that anyone involved in a crime made a necessary
contribution to that offense, and it proudly brushed aside the need
for a ‘substantial contribution’ on the assured ground that the
‘necessary element of a sufficient set formula is the essence of the
concept of causation.’105 Indeed, in an essay I would highly
recommend to all and sundry, Derek Parfit invites us to accept that
those who make imperceptibly small contributions to joint harm
are still responsible for that harm when operating in collective
constructs.106 In essence, he incites international criminal lawyers
to do away with the need for a ‘substantial contribution.’ And yet,
if international criminal law has anything to contribute to these
theories, it is that the extrapolation of garden-variety principles
onto the international stage in an increasing interdependent global
102
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society casts a very wide net. Thus, our solution for
overdetermination risks serious over-inclusion, drawing us back
into the opposite set of problems that inhere in causation.
V. CONCLUSION
Overdetermination poses serious problems for international
criminal justice, where the individual agency upon which criminal
responsibility depends tends to diminish in direct proportion to the
scale of mass violence. Accordingly, a coherent explanation of the
relationship between responsibility and overdetermined causes is a
pressing issue for international criminal justice, if responsibility is
to be based on principle not discretion. Despite this, causation in
general and overdetermination in particular have escaped sustained
discussion within the discipline, as we theorists expend an undue
amount of energy on ‘modes of liability’ that are less fundamental
next to basic understandings of cause and effect. Although this
essay has sought to begin a new discussion about overdetermined
causation rather than offer any definite solution, several practical
and conceptual implications are immediately apparent at this early
stage.
First, the standard test that is used as a refrain in
international judgments, that ‘[a]lthough the accused’s conduct
need not have been a condition sine qua non of the commission of
the crime, it must have made a difference,’107 is at best unhelpful
and at worst fundamentally incoherent. In either case, the phrase
obscures the real moral and legal principles at issue here, which go
to the heart of any attempt to hold individuals to account for moral
wrongdoing within systemic campaigns of violence. Consequently,
more must be said about causation, better defenses of the dominant
fine-grained account of ‘but for’ causation offered, and greater
investigation of NESS theories explored, in order to arrive at a
more principled position than that presently on offer in
international criminal trials. Without these, modern trials depend
upon faith rather than justifiable principle.
Second, I do not believe that making ‘an essential contribution’
is a normatively principled means of assigning blame to any type
of participant in international crimes. As we have seen, the ICC
has recently followed German criminal theory in concluding that
107
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co-perpetration requires an agreement with others coupled with an
essential contribution in the sense of being able to frustrate the
commission of the crime. And yet few international crimes involve
“essential” contributions of this sort, as even the firing-squad
example shows. None of the Dresden pilots or board members of
Western companies in apartheid made essential contributions, but
they jointly perpetrated crimes for which they should be called to
account. This is true of crimes perpetrated within organizations
that have shared goals within well-defined structures, as well as in
mereological groups that are only a chance assembly of disparate
agents who are acting similarly.
Third, collective responsibility is not an adequate solution
to the problem. True, if one does not share the widespread
misgivings with corporate criminal liability,108 we could hold
companies operating in apartheid accountable by deploying
corporate criminal liability. Instead of worrying about individual
contributions by boardmembers, the corporation itself becomes our
target. But notice how this does not immediately extend to the
other organizations we have considered; holding Thomas
Lubanga’s rebel group responsible, criminally or otherwise, is not
an obvious option. More acutely, our appeal to collective
responsibility struggles to account for the mereological group of
independent arms vendors such as Bout, who share no joint
characteristics, structure or identity. And in any event, collective
responsibility cannot excuse individuals.
Fourth, it is too early to concede that individual criminal
responsibility is structurally incapable of accounting for the
collective nature of most international crimes. Before arriving at
that conclusion, we must wrestle with the unwieldy problem that is
overdetermination with much greater zeal. To be sure, the
foregoing suggests that the challenge is significant, but the
problem of overdetermination resonates with our deepest sense of
108
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what it means to participate in atrocity and therefore requires a
robust conceptual solution. I suspect, for instance, that at least part
of what Hannah Arendt famously calls “the banality of evil” is that
terrible violence often involves playing a consequentially benign
part in a wider horror that would take place regardless of one’s
participation;109 what makes radical evil so banal is that the most
terrible individual actions frequently make no discernable
difference.
Moreover, overdetermination should leave us asking
uncomfortable questions of ourselves; it is the central moral
problem of our time. In a globalized society where markets enable
atrocities, we all make utterly banal contributions to international
crimes: by buying diamond jewelry that provides an important
means of financing unspeakable bloodshed; purchasing all range of
electronics that almost certainly contain other conflict resources;
flying airplanes whose manufacturers use our fares to subsidize
their production of weapons systems that ultimately find their way
into the hands of brutal warlords; and by buying low-cost clothing
we know was produced in subhuman conditions. We rightly tell
ourselves that we do not personally make a difference to these
atrocities; but that is hardly the point. In the end, we are left with
the unsettling sense that participating in atrocity is terrifyingly
normal.
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